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Abstract
Interacting agents in ¯nance represent a behavioral, agent-based approach in
which ¯nancial markets are viewed as complex adaptive systems consisting
of many boundedly rational agents interacting through simple heterogeneous
investment strategies, constantly adapting their behavior in response to
new information, strategy performance and through social interactions. An
interacting agent system acts as a noise ¯lter, transforming and amplifying
purely random news about economic fundamentals into an aggregate market
outcome exhibiting important stylized facts such as unpredictable asset
prices and returns, excess volatility, temporary bubbles and sudden crashes,
large and persistent trading volume, clustered volatility and long memory.
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1Interacting Agents in Finance
Interacting agents in ¯nance represent a new behavioral, agent-based approach in
which ¯nancial markets are viewed as complex adaptive systems consisting of many
boundedly rational, heterogeneous agents interacting through simple investment
strategies, constantly learning from each other as new information becomes avail-
able and adapting their behavior accordingly over time. Simple interactions at the
individual, micro level cause sophisticated structure and emergent phenomena at
the aggregate, macro level. Recent surveys of this approach are Hommes (2006) and
LeBaron (2006).
The traditional approach in ¯nance is based on a representative, rational agent
who makes optimal investment decisions and has rational expectations about future
developments. Friedman (1953) made an early, strong argument in favor of ratio-
nality, arguing that \irrational" agents would lose money whereas rational agents
would earn higher pro¯ts. This is essentially an evolutionary argument saying that
irrational agents will be driven out of the market by rational agents. In a perfectly
rational world, information is transmitted instantaneously, asset prices re°ect eco-
nomic fundamentals and asset allocations are e±cient. In the traditional view, agents
only interact through the price system.
In contrast, Keynes earlier stressed that prices of speculative assets are not only
driven by market fundamentals, but that \market psychology" also plays an impor-
tant role. Another early critique on perfect rationality is due to Simon (1957), who
emphasized that agents are limited in their computing abilities and face informa-
tion gathering costs. Therefore individual behavior is more accurately described by
simple, suboptimal \rules of thumb". Along similar lines, Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) in psychology argued that individual decision behavior under uncertainty can
be better described by simple heuristics and biases. In the last decade the traditional
view of ¯nancial markets has become challenged through developments in bounded
rationality (e.g. Sargent, 1993), behavioral ¯nance (e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003)
and computational, agent-based modeling (e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006).
Fundamentalists versus chartists
Most interacting agents models in ¯nance include two important classes of investors:
fundamentalists and chartists. Fundamentalists base their investment decisions upon
market fundamentals, such as interest rates, growth of the economy, company's earn-
ings, etc. Fundamentalists expect the asset price to move towards its fundamental
value and buy (sell) assets that are undervalued (overvalued). In contrast, chartists
or technical analysts look for simple patterns, e.g. trends, in past prices and base
their investment decisions upon extrapolation of these patterns. For a long time,
technical analysis has been viewed as \irrational" and, according to the Friedman
argument, chartists would be driven out of the market by rational investors. Frankel
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chartists in real ¯nancial markets. Evidence from survey data on exchange rate ex-
pectations (e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1987, and Allen and Taylor, 1990) shows that at
short time horizons (say up to 3 months) ¯nancial forecasters tend to use destabiliz-
ing, trend following forecasting rules, whereas at longer horizons (say 3-12 months or
longer) they tend to use stabilizing, mean reverting, fundamental forecasts. Frankel
and Froot (1986) argue that the interaction of chartists and fundamentalists am-
pli¯ed the strong rise and subsequent fall of the dollar exchange rate in the mid
eighties.
Another simple interacting agent system with chartists and fundamentalists
driven by herding behavior is due to Kirman (1991,1993). This model was moti-
vated by puzzling behavior of ants observed by entomologists. A colony of ants
facing two identical food sources distributes asymmetrically, say 80%-20%, over the
two sources. Moreover, at some point in time the distribution suddenly reverses
to 20%-80%. Kirman (1993) proposed a simple stochastic model explaining ants'
behavior and applied it to a ¯nancial market setting (Kirman, 1991). Agents can
choose between two investment strategies, a fundamentalist or a chartist strategy,
to invest in a risky asset. Two agents meet at random and with some interaction-
conversion probability one agent will adopt the view of the other. There is also a
small self-conversion probability that the agent will change her view no matter what
the other agent believes. It turns out that when the interaction-conversion proba-
bility is relatively high compared to the self-conversion probability, the distribution
of agents is bimodal. The behavior of the agents is very persistent and the market
tends to be dominated by one group for a long time, but then the majority of agents
suddenly switches to the other view, etc.
But what about the Friedman argument? Will not \irrational" technical trading
rules be driven out of the market by rational investment strategies? DeLong et al.
(1990) presented one of the ¯rst models showing that this need not be the case. Their
model contains two types of traders, noise traders, with erroneous stochastic beliefs,
and rational traders who are perfectly rational and take into account the presence of
noise traders. Noise traders create extra risk and risk averse rational traders are not
willing to fully arbitrage away the mispricing. Noise traders bear more risk and can
earn higher realized returns than rational traders, and therefore noise traders can
survive in the long run. Lux (1995) presents a herding model with fundamentalists
and chartists, whose behavior is driven by imitation and past realized returns leading
to temporary bubbles and sudden crashes. Furthermore, Brock et al. (1992) showed
empirically using 90 years of daily Dow Jones index data that technical trading rules
can generate signi¯cant above normal returns.
3Markets as complex adaptive systems
Since the end of the eighties, multi-disciplinary research as done at the Santa Fe
Institute (SFI) (e.g Anderson, Arrow and Pines, 1988) has stimulated a lot of work on
interacting agents in economics and ¯nance. Models of interacting particle systems
in physics served as examples how local interaction at the micro level may explain
structure, for example a phase transition, at the macro level. This has motivated
economists to study the economy as an evolving complex system.
Arthur et al. (1997) consider the so-called SFI arti¯cial stock market consisting
of an ocean of di®erent types of agents choosing among many simple investment
strategies. Agents' investment decisions are a®ected by their expectations or beliefs
about future asset prices. Beliefs a®ect realized prices, which in turn determine new
beliefs, etc. Prices and beliefs about prices thus co-evolve over time, and agents
continuously adapt their behavior as new observation become available, replacing
less successful strategies by more successful ones. Are simple forecasting strategies
irrational and will rational traders outperform technical traders in such an arti¯cial
market? In general not. The reason is that a speculative asset market is an expec-
tations feedback system. Imagine a situation where an asset price is overvalued and
the majority of traders remains optimistic expecting the rising trend to continue.
Aggregate demand will increase and as a result the asset price will rise even further.
Optimistic expectations thus become self-ful¯lling and chartists will earn higher re-
alized returns than fundamental traders who sold or shortened the asset because
they expected a decline in its price. As long as optimistic traders dominate the mar-
ket and reenforce the price rise, fundamentalists will lose money. Even when the
fundamentalists may be right in the long run, there are \limits to arbitrage", e.g.
due to short selling constraints, preventing them to hold their positions long enough
against a prevailing optimistic view, as stressed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Emergent phenomena and stylized facts
The interacting agents approach has been strongly motivated by a number of im-
portant stylized facts observed in many ¯nancial time series (e.g. Brock, 1997): (i)
unpredictable asset prices and returns; (ii) large, persistent trading volume; (iii) ex-
cess volatility and persistent deviations from fundamental value, and (iv) clustered
volatility and long memory. According to (i) asset prices are di±cult to predict. New
information is absorbed quickly in asset prices and there is \`no easy free lunch", that
is, arbitrage opportunities are di±cult to ¯nd and exploit. The traditional rational,
representative agent framework can explain (i), but has di±culty in explaining the
other stylized facts (ii)-(iv). In particular, in a world with only rational, risk averse
investors with asymmetric information there can be no trade, because no trader can
bene¯t from superior information since other rational traders will anticipate that
this agent must have superior information and therefore will not agree to trade (e.g.
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huge daily trading volume observed in real ¯nancial markets, which suggests that
there must be other types of heterogeneity such as di®erences in opinion about fu-
ture movements. Stylized fact (iii) means that °uctuations in asset prices are much
larger than °uctuations in underlying market fundamentals. This point has been
emphasized e.g. by Shiller (1981). When markets are excessively volatile, prices can
deviate from their fundamental values for a long time. Stylized fact (iv) means that
price °uctuations are characterized by irregular switching between quiet, low volatil-
ity phases, with small price °uctuations, and turbulent phases of high volatility and
large swings in asset prices. Interacting agent models have been able to explain these
stylized facts simultaneously (e.g. LeBaron et al., 1999, Lux and Marchesi, 1999).
Evolutionary selection of strategies
Blume (1993) and Brock (1993) present a general probabilistic framework for strat-
egy selection motivated by results from interacting particle systems in physics, see
also FÄ ollmer (1974). The probability of agents using strategy h changes over time
according to a random utility ¯tness measure of the general form
Uht = ¼ht + Sht + ²ht: (1)
Here ¼ht represents private utility, for example given by (a weighted average of)
realized pro¯t, realized utility or forecasting performance. Sht represents social utility
measuring herding behavior or social interactions as in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b).
For example, agents may behave as conformists, that is, they are more likely to follow
strategies that are more popular among the population (global interaction) or among
their neighbors (local interaction). Agents observe the performance of each strategy
with some idiosyncratic errors, represented by ²ht.
A frequently used model for the probabilities or fractions of the di®erent strategy
types is the discrete choice or multinomial logit model
nht = e
¯Uh;t¡1 = Zt¡1; (2)
where Zt¡1 =
P
j e¯Uj;t¡1 is a normalization factor so that the fractions add up to one.
When the errors ²ht in (1) are independently and identically distributed according to
a double exponential distribution, the probability of choosing strategy h is exactly
given by (2). The crucial feature of (2) is that the higher the ¯tness of trading
strategy h the more agents will select strategy h, and therefore it is essentially an
evolutionary selection mechanism. Agents are boundedly rational and tend to follow
strategies that have performed well in the (recent) past. The parameter ¯ is called
the intensity of choice and is inversely related to the variance of the noise ²ht. It
measures how sensitive agents are to selecting the optimal strategy. The extreme
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cannot be observed and all fractions will be equal to 1=H, where H is the number
of strategies. The other extreme ¯ = +1 corresponds to the case without noise, so
that the deterministic part of the ¯tness is observed perfectly and in each period, all
agents choose the optimal forecast. An increase in the intensity of choice ¯ represents
an increase in the degree of rationality concerning strategy selection.
Brock and Hommes (1997,1998) propose a simple, analytically tractable hetero-
geneous agent model to show how non-rational strategies can survive evolutionary
selection. Brock and Hommes (1997) consider a market with an endogenous evolu-
tionary selection of expectations rules described by the multi-nomial logit model (2),
with ¯tness given by past realized pro¯ts. Agents choose between a set of di®erent
forecasting rules and tend to switch to forecasting strategies that have performed well
in the recent past. When agents face information gathering costs, because sophisti-
cated rational strategies are more costly to obtain, simple rule of thumb strategies
can survive in this market. In Brock and Hommes (1998) this evolutionary selec-
tion of strategies is applied to a standard asset pricing model similar to, but much
simpler than the SFI arti¯cial stock market. Agents choose between fundamental-
ists'and chartists' investment strategies. When the sensitivity to di®erences in past
performance of the strategies is high (i.e. the parameter ¯ is high), evolutionary
selection of strategies destabilizes the system and leads to complicated, possibly
chaotic asset price °uctuations around the benchmark rational expectations funda-
mental price. The °uctuations are characterized by an irregular switching between
a quiet phase with asset prices close to the fundamental and a more turbulent phase
with asset prices following (temporary) trends or bubbles. In contrast with Fried-
man's argument, chartists can survive in this evolutionary competition and may
on average earn (short run) pro¯ts equal or even higher than (short run) pro¯ts of
fundamentalists.
A common ¯nding in these models is that more rationality, i.e. a larger intensity
of choice, leads to instability. The intuition is that random choice leads to stability,
because agents will be evenly distributed over the strategy space without systematic
biases. In contrast, correlated choice may cause instability when e.g. many traders
switch to a pro¯table trend following strategy. Another common ¯nding is that
when the social interaction e®ect is strong, multiple equilibria exist and it depends
sensitively on the initial state to which of the many equilibria the market system
will settle down (e.g. Brock and Durlauf 2001a,b).
Summary and Future Perspective
Although the approach in ¯nance is relatively new interacting agent models have
been able to explain important stylized facts simultaneously. An interacting agents
system acts as a noise ¯lter, transforming and amplifying purely random news about
6economic fundamentals into an aggregate market outcome exhibiting excess volatil-
ity, temporary bubbles and sudden crashes, large and persistent trading volume,
clustered volatility and long memory. It should be emphasized that at the aggregate
level these asset price °uctuations are highly irregular and unpredictable and there
exists no easy free lunch and arbitrage will be very di±cult and risky in such a
market.
Much more theoretical work is needed in this area, for example, to ¯nd the `sim-
plest tractable model' explaining all important stylized facts. Speculative bubbles
have been observed in laboratory experiments of Smith et al. (1988) and more re-
cently in Hommes et al. (2005), showing that coordination on trend following rules
can destabilize a laboratory experimental asset market. Another important topic for
future research is estimation of interacting agent models on ¯nancial data. Boswijk
et al. (2005) is one of the ¯rst attempts to estimation of an evolutionary model with
fundamentalists versus trend following chartists using yearly S&P 500 data, suggest-
ing that trend following behavior ampli¯ed the strong rise in stock prices at the end
of the nineties. In the next decade, more laboratory experiments and estimation of
interacting agents models is needed to test the robustness and empirical relevance
of the interacting agents approach.
Cars Hommes
See also: mathematics of networks, ergodicity and nonergodicity in economics, the-
ory of social interactions, chaos, empirics of social interaction, network formation.
Finance, corporate ¯nance, ¯nance: recent development, real estate ¯nance. Bounded
rationality, economic complexity.
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